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Evolutionary algorithmThe amount of public statistical information available is growing and more accurate pro-
tection methods are needed in order to achieve data conﬁdentiality. The Post-Randomiza-
tion Method (PRAM) protection method was introduced in 1997 as a very powerful method
for categorical microdata, but it is still not widely used. This method has a Markov matrix
as a parameter. The main problem of the application of this method is that it is difﬁcult to
ﬁnd a good Markov matrix that performs changes in the microdata ﬁle producing low loss
of valuable information and low risk of disclosure of sensitive data.
In this paper we present a methodology that helps us to ﬁnd a matrix to perform better
protections. This is achieved by using an evolutionary algorithm with integrated Informa-
tion Loss and Disclosure Risk measures. Experiments using three different datasets are also
presented in order to empirically evaluate the application of this technique.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Nowadays dissemination of information is continuously growing and, because of that, protecting the conﬁdentiality of
individuals has become more important. Information such as social security numbers, business names, or personal ID
numbers must be protected because it can uniquely identify an individual and, if it is identiﬁed, all its conﬁdential informa-
tion is going to be disclosed. Furthermore, protecting this information alone to individual identiﬁers may be not enough
because, as it is described in [18], the identity of individuals can be obtained by linking groups of records between different
datasets resulting in an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information. Some examples of attributes to be protected
together as quasi-identiﬁers are zip code, gender, and birth date.
In addition, when applying Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) methods, one has to deal with two competing goals: the
microdata ﬁle has to be safe enough to guarantee the protection of individual respondents but at the same time the loss of
information should not be too large. A discussion about this issue can be found in [9].
There have been different approaches for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining [1] and Statistical Disclosure Control [14,21] in
order to achieve better protections to prevent attacks to the conﬁdential information about individuals from the dissemi-
nated data. Protection methods can be classiﬁed into two generic categories: the ﬁrst one is the group of methods that mask
the original dataset generating a modiﬁed version which are called perturbative methods, and the second one is the group of
methods that generate synthetic data that preserve some desired characteristics of the original which are called non-pertur-
bative methods.
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problem of categorical data over continuous data is that there are less actions to perform in the protection process because
arithmetic operations are not allowed. Then the only actions allowed with categorical data are the exchange of categories by
others that already exist, categories suppression, and generalizations of some categories into new ones. This lack of possible
operations makes the protection a difﬁcult task.
There exist several protection methods applicable to categorical data. Some of them are Microaggregation [19], Top
Coding, Bottom Coding, Global Recoding [15], and Post Randomization Method (PRAM).
PRAM is a powerful protection method that is based on changing categories on the basis of a Markov matrix. PRAM gener-
alizes TopCoding, BottomCoding, andGlobal Recoding aswith a properMarkovmatrix PRAMreduces to thepreviousmethods.
There have been somediscussions about PRAMand its properties, see e.g. [11,22]. Nevertheless PRAM is still not verywidely
used in categorical microdata protection because of the difﬁculty of obtaining a good Markov matrix for good protection. For
example, in [7], data protection using PRAM leads to the worst results when compared to other data protection methods.
There also exist some work on ﬁnding the best PRAM matrices like in [4] where the authors provide an analytical
approach to ﬁnd optimal PRAM matrices. They use Information Loss measures different than the ones we use and they rely
on analytical methods to ﬁnd the best solution. However, our approach relies on an evolutionary algorithm that evolves
autonomously without taking into account analytical methods.
In this paper, we show how Information Loss and Disclosure Risk measures can be integrated within an evolutionary algo-
rithm to seek new and enhanced PRAMMarkov matrices in order to obtain better protections for categorical microdata mak-
ing. This work is an extension of [16] where we presented an approach that consists of a pre-masking optimization based on
an evolutionary algorithm applied to an initial population of one PRAMmatrix. However, while in [16] we considered only an
initial population of a single PRAM matrix performing univariate protections, here we consider a population of more than
one PRAMmatrix in order to be able to perform multivariate protections. In addition we present all brand new experimental
results in this framework of multivariate protections and using also more datasets than in [16].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the PRAM protection method, Section 3 introduces
our proposed algorithm, experimental results with three data sets are given in Section 4 and, ﬁnally, concluding remarks and
possible future work are listed in Section 5.
2. The PRAM protection method
The Post Randomization Method (PRAM) was described as a method for disclosure protection of microdata, especially
focused on categorical variables.
The idea of this method is to change the categories on some categorical variables for certain records to different ones
according to prescribed Markov matrices. Each matrix contains the swapping probabilities for all the possible pairs of
categories of a single variable. Although those matrices are the key point for the PRAM method, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a good
matrix that leads to a good trade-off between data perturbation (Information Loss) and Disclosure Risk. The Markov
approach makes PRAM very general, because it generalizes noise addition, data suppression, and data recoding.
The following subsections describe the kind of matrix used in this work and the analytical measures used to evaluate the
PRAM protection performance.
2.1. PRAM matrix
In the discussion we understand pkl as the probability of exchanging category k to category l, and then the following
equality
Pn
l¼1pkl ¼ 1 is required.
The type of matrix used in this work is a full matrix with off-diagonal elements depending on the frequencies in the ori-
ginal microdata ﬁle which is used in [5]. Formally, the probability pkk is constant for all k and its value is given as a parameter.
However, the probability pkl where k– l, is computed as followspkl ¼
ð1 pkkÞ
Pn
i¼1TnðiÞ  TnðkÞ  TnðlÞ
 
ðn 2Þ Pni¼1TnðiÞ  TnðkÞ
  ð1Þwhere TnðiÞ is the frequency of the ith category in the original dataset. Using this approach, the biggest exchange probabil-
ities are assigned to the categories with lower frequency in the original dataset in order to cause more confusion in the pro-
tected dataset.
2.2. Analytical measures
After protecting microdata, their quality needs to be assessed. To do that we used the two most popular measures: the
Information Loss and the Disclosure Risk.
Information Loss [6] is known as the quantity of harm that is inﬂicted to the data by a given masking method. This mea-
sure is small when the analytic structure of the masked dataset is very similar to the structure of the original dataset, so, the
motivation for preserving the structure of the dataset is to ensure that the masked dataset will be analytically valid and
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table-based information loss (CTBIL) [6], distance-based information loss (DBIL) [6], and entropy-based information loss
(EBIL) [6]. In order to get a single indicator of the overall Information Loss we used the mean value of all three measures
as shown in Eq. (2).ILðXÞ ¼ CTBILðXÞ þ DBILðXÞ þ EBILðXÞ
3
ð2ÞAssessment of the protection method quality cannot be limited to Information Loss because Disclosure Risk has also to be
measured. Disclosure Risk [7] is known as the amount of original information that can be obtained by an intruder from the
masked dataset. This measure is small when the masked dataset values are different from the original ones. In this work we
used three different Disclosure Risk measures. The ﬁrst one is the interval disclosure (ID) [7], which checks the quantity of
individual original values that can be discovered from the masked dataset. The second and third measures are the distance-
based record linkage (DBRL) [8] and the probabilistic record linkage (PRL) [8] ant they check the number of masked records
that can be linked to their original ones, this is, the number of disclosed records in the masked dataset. As in the Information
Loss case we wanted to have a single Disclosure Risk value so we used the mean value of interval disclosure measure and the
maximum value of record linkage measures as shown in Eq. (3).DRðXÞ ¼ IDðXÞ þmaxðDBRLðXÞ; PRLðXÞÞ
2
ð3ÞAlthough the goal is to minimize both measures, they are inversely related. Because of this, if we perform a very aggres-
sive protection we will obtain a very high Information Loss but a very low Disclosure Risk and, if we perform a very weak
protection, we will obtain a very low Information Loss but a very high Disclosure Risk. Then, a protection will be considered
good if it has low and balanced values for both measures.
3. Evolutionary algorithm for multivariate Post-Randomization Method (PRAM)
Evolutionary algorithms are stochastic processes inspired by biological evolution, generally oriented to ﬁnd exact or
approximate solutions to optimization or search problems.
Usually, evolutionary algorithms work with a population of solutions but they can also work taking into account the
whole population as a single solution.
These algorithms maintain a population of individuals, denoted as PðtÞ for generation t. Each individual X 0j 2 PðtÞ is eval-
uated by some measure of their ‘‘ﬁtness’’. Fitness evaluation is used to guide individuals from generation to generation. Some
of the selected members are altered by operators with an evolutive connotation, such as mutation and crossover. These oper-
ators create offspring from the existing population members from previous generations. Surviving individuals are evaluated
again, and the process is repeated until some stopping criteria is reached. From this basic schememany particularizations are
possible [2,17].
Algorithm 1. Evolutionary Algorithm to Enhance PRAM Matrices
Input: Pð0Þ ¼ fX1; . . . ;Xng initial population of PRAM matrices
Output: PðtÞ ¼ fX01; . . . ;X0ng ﬁnal population of PRAM matrices
t ( 0
fitness evalðPð0ÞÞ
while stoppingðPðtÞÞ– true; do
Xj ( PRAM matrix selected randomly from the population
alter ( randomly choose between mutation and cross
if alter by mutation then
X0j ( mutateðXjÞ
else
X0j ( crossðXjÞ
end if
if fitness evalðX0jÞ < fitness evalðXjÞ then
replaceðXj;X0jÞ
end if
t ( t þ 1
end while
return PðtÞ
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The algorithm starts with an initial population that is a set of PRAM matrices (one matrix for each attribute to protect).
Then, before the iterative process starts, we evaluate the ﬁtness of this set of matrices when they are used to protect the
original data. By doing the initial evaluation score we obtain a reference point to know whether the algorithm is improving
or not at each generation. The iterative part, where each iteration represents a new generation, keeps altering the matrices
using one of the two genetic operators: mutation and crossover. In order to not alter the values of matrices too much, and
make the generations evolve more smoothly, the genetic operator to perform will be selected randomly with a probability of
a 0.5 and only one of them will be applied in the same generation. After applying the operator to the selected matrix we
obtain a new offspring and they have to be evaluated in order to know whether the new offspring is better than its parent
or not (i.e. the offspring has lower ﬁtness value than its parent). After ﬁtness evaluation, an elitist replacement strategy is
followed, which means that the new individual and its parent compete with each other and only the one with the best score
(i.e. the lowest ﬁtness score) will be selected as the individual in the population for the next generation. Finally, the stopping
criteria of the iterative process is not ﬁxed and it can be chosen by the user. Different examples of stopping criteria could be a
maximum number of generations, to reach a certain ﬁtness value, a minimum difference of ﬁtness value between genera-
tions,. . .However, terminating the execution when the difference of ﬁtness is below a certain threshold is dangerous as it
is very likely to end too early because if none of the offspring is good enough to be inserted in the population, the ﬁtness
change for this generation will be zero but it does not mean that we reached an optimal solution.
In our case we have not used any of those and we let it run indeﬁnitely and we stopped them manually when we ran out
of time.
Another important issue to comment is that, as we are dealing with multivariate PRAM protections and we do not want to
make abrupt changes into the PRAM matrices, only one matrix will be treated in each generation and its selection is done
randomly.
Finally, at the end of our algorithm execution we obtain a set of PRAM matrices that perform better multivariate protec-
tions to the data than the original ones.
In the following subsections we will describe the key points of our evolutionary algorithm such as genotype encoding
(Section 3.1), genetic operators (Section 3.2) and ﬁtness function (Section 3.3), as well as the way we integrate the analytical
measures presented in Section 2.2 within our evolutionary algorithm.
3.1. Genotype encoding
The individuals inside population should be represented in an easy and effective way to be dealt with by the algorithm. In
our case, PRAM matrices are transition matrices based on probabilities so they contain numerical values with decimals. For
the sake of simplicity we decided to multiply the values by 1000 and then take only the integer part. By doing this we will
have integer values in the range ½0;1000.
Although integer values are much easier to deal with than ﬂoating point values, it is still not a good representation. We
decided then to convert the integer values into their binary representation. This representation is a good one to deal with
when altering values because it only needs to ﬂip bit values from 0 to 1 and vice versa. Finally, in [12] the authors showed
that the use o Gray code in evolutionary algorithms allows to obtain faster and more accurate solutions than using regular
binary representation so we decided to use this representation in our approach. A discussion about the use of Gray coding is
also discussed in [3].
Fig. 1 shows the encoding process of a PRAM matrix into a Gray-coded genome matrix ready to be used in the evolution-
ary algorithm.
3.2. Genetic operators
We used the two most popular genetic operators in our approach: mutation and crossover [13].
Mutation is performed by a simple value alteration as follows. Take a random value from the individual X and consider
that the value at this position is xi with genome genomeðxiÞ ¼ bjbj1 . . . b1. Choose a random bit position k, such that 1 6 k 6 j.
Then a new individual is obtained just by replacing the bit bk by its negation counterpart, b
0
k ¼ notðbkÞ.
Although the crossover deﬁnition says that it uses two different individuals to cross them and obtain two new offspring,
in our case, we use the whole population as a single solution and we adapted this operator to our case.
Crossover of the individual X is performed by swapping two ranges of values inside the individual as follows. Take two
value positions s; r at random, and consider that the two values at this position are xs 2 X and xr 2 X. Generate a random
number m to indicate the ranges length which must be in the range ½0;minðlengthðXÞ  s; lengthðXÞ  r; js rjÞ, where
lengthðXÞ is the total number of values inside the individual X, and k is the absolute value operator. Then the ranges
½xs; xsþm and ½xr ; xrþm are swapped obtaining a new individual. For example, having s < r and X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng the new
individual will be X0 ¼ fx1; . . . ; xr ; . . . ; xrþm; . . . ; xs; . . . ; xsþm; . . . ; xng.
Fig. 1. Example of genotype encoding.
Table 1
Initial PRAMmatrix using Eq. (1) with p = 0.5 for the attribute DEGREE in the U.S. Housing Survey dataset. The bold values represent the most probable category
where each one will be changed to when using the PRAM matrix to protect the data.
0.500 0.067 0.060 0.065 0.067 0.076 0.080 0.083
0.073 0.500 0.058 0.064 0.066 0.075 0.080 0.083
0.072 0.064 0.500 0.062 0.064 0.074 0.080 0.083
0.073 0.065 0.057 0.500 0.066 0.075 0.080 0.083
0.073 0.066 0.058 0.064 0.500 0.075 0.080 0.083
0.074 0.068 0.061 0.066 0.068 0.500 0.080 0.083
0.075 0.068 0.062 0.067 0.069 0.076 0.500 0.083
0.075 0.069 0.062 0.067 0.069 0.077 0.081 0.500
Table 2
Frequencies of the DEGREE attribute in the U.S. Housing Survey dataset.
Categories ‘1’ ‘2’ ‘3’ ‘4’ ‘5’ ‘6’ ‘9’ ‘–’
Frequency 98 173 251 195 170 80 33 0
Table 3
Initial and ﬁnal Scores for the protection of the three attributes DEGREE, BUILT, GRADE1 in U.S. Housing dataset at the same
time.
IL DR Score
Initial 63.14 31.08 47.11
Final 53.77 8.61 31.20
348 J. Marés, V. Torra / Information Sciences 278 (2014) 344–3563.3. Fitness function
The evolutionary algorithm needs a mechanism to check the quality of the individuals in the population (in both the ini-
tial ones and the new offspring in each generation). The ﬁtness function is this mechanism.
Fig. 2. Evolution of the measures for the individual protection of the three attributes BUILT, DEGREE and GRADE1 in U.S. Housing dataset.
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PRAM matrices values are in Gray code representation so it is needed to restore them to ﬂoating point values. Then, it is not
possible to check the quality of the matrices just by taking a look at them so, as a second step, we use these matrices to per-
form the multivariate PRAM protection on the original data obtaining a certain protected dataset. After this second step we
are ﬁnally able to check the protection quality using the two measures described in Section 2.2: Information Loss and Dis-
closure Risk.
As there are two measures to be taken into account, it can be considered as a multi-objective optimization problem. To
solve this we chose a multi-objective optimization method called Objective Weighting which allows us to combine both
measures applying an individual weight to each one. We wanted to give the same importance to both Disclosure Risk
(DR) and Information Loss (IL) measures, so both have 12 as a weight value.
If F is the original ﬁle and PRAMmultivariateðF; fX1; . . . ;XngÞ is the function that performs multivariate PRAM protection in F
with the set of PRAM matrices fX01; . . . ;X 0ng, then, the score of the set of matrices fX1; . . . ;Xng is computed as followsX01; . . . ;X
0
n
  ¼ restoreðfX1; . . . ;XngÞ ð4Þ
F 0 ¼ PRAMmultivariate F; X 01; . . . ;X0n
   ð5Þ
Score X01; . . . ;X
0
n
   ¼ DRðF
0Þ þ ILðF 0Þ
2
ð6Þwhere DRðÞ is the Disclosure Risk evaluation function and ILðÞ is the Information Loss evaluation function.
Because the PRAM method takes random decisions in the protection step, the method can generate different protected
ﬁles for the same Markov matrix, and they will also have different scores. In order to have more robust results, we compute
5 protected ﬁles for each candidate to be evaluated (i.e. each Markov matrix) and the average of their scores is taken as the
candidate’s ﬁnal score. It should be noticed that the number of executions to perform is not ﬁxed and it can be changed by
the user. We used 5 executions because with it we obtained enough robust results without penalizing too much the execu-
tion time. More formally:FinalScoreðfX1; . . . ;XngÞ ¼
P5
i¼1Score X
0
1; . . . ;X
0
n
  
5
ð7Þ4. Experimental results
In order to illustrate and empirically evaluate our proposed method we used three different datasets to perform some
experiments. The ﬁrst dataset is a U.S. Housing Survey of 1993 from the U.S. Census Bureau [20] with 1000 records andFig. 3. Results for the protection of all three attributes at the same time in the U.S. Housing dataset.
Table 4
Initial and ﬁnal Scores for the protection of the three attributes EXISTACC, PRESEMPLOY, and SAVINGS in the German dataset at
the same time.
IL DR Score
Initial 80.36 25.63 52.99
Final 38.39 27.30 32.84
Fig. 4. Evolution of the measures for individual protection of the three attributes EXISTACC, PRESEMPLOY, and SAVINGS in the German dataset.
J. Marés, V. Torra / Information Sciences 278 (2014) 344–356 35111 categorical attributes. The second dataset contains information about credit risk of German people [10], and consists of
1000 records and 20 attributes. Finally the third dataset contains information about Solar Flares [10], and consists of 1389
records and 10 attributes.
352 J. Marés, V. Torra / Information Sciences 278 (2014) 344–356In these experiments we chose p = 0.5 as a parameter value to create the initial Markov matrices. This value represents
the quantity of original values that are wanted to be kept after perturbation (in this case we want to keep only 50% of the
original values). Its value is up to the data user and, in this work, we used this value to demonstrate the ability to ﬁnd good
matrices from a bad one. As an example, Table 1 shows the initial Markov matrix for the DEGREE attribute corresponding to
the U.S. Housing Survey data set with 8 categories, and Table 2 shows the frequencies of the categories corresponding to this
attribute in the original data set. Note that the max values in each row are highlighted.
It is easy to see that the higher off-diagonal values corresponds to the attributes that have less frequency inside the ori-
ginal data set. This effect makes that, after the protection process, the frequencies of all categories are more balanced in order
to increase the uncertainty inside the data set. Then, the problem here is to obtain a good PRAM matrix in order to achieve a
better protection minimizing the Information Loss and the Disclosure Risk. (see Table 3).
Our proposed method a priori applies to any particular PRAM matrix, but of course it is generally better to start from a
good matrix.
Each experiment is divided in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, some attributes are going to be protected independently
checking the performance of our method when only one attribute is protected, while in the second phase all the previous
attributes are going to be protected together at the same time checking the performance of our method when multi-attribute
protection is performed.
In our ﬁrst experiment we used the U.S. Housing Survey dataset considering 3 attributes to protect and their respective
PRAM matrices. The ﬁrst attribute is named DEGREE and it has 8 different ordinal categories, the second one is the BUILT
attribute with 25 different ordinal categories, and ﬁnally, the third attribute is named GRADE1 with 21 different ordinal
categories.
Starting with the ﬁrst experiment, Fig. 2 shows the results for the measures evolution for the individual protections of the
three attributes (BUILT, DEGREE, and GRADE1) during all the 1125 generations.
As it can be seen, Information Loss and Disclosure Risk are being adjusted in order to reduce the Score value. It does not
mean that all measures are decreasing all the time (e.g. there is an increment of the Information Loss at generation 200).
Score is the only measure that is strictly decreasing its value and never increases, so this implies that the result at any gen-
eration will be at least as good as the previous one.
Looking at the decrement of the Score we can see that, during the optimization approach that we propose, the measure
has been reduced quite signiﬁcantly in all the cases. It means that the new PRAM matrix performs a much better protection
than the original one.
Once we know that our approach is working quite good when protecting isolated attributes, a multi-attribute protection
can also be performed.
In Fig. 3 we can ﬁnd the evolution of the Information Loss, Disclosure Risk and Score for this multi-attribute protection.
During the evolutionary process it can be seen that there is a progressive decrement until around generation 1100 of the
Score value during all the process. Moreover, Disclosure Risk has suffered a big decrement, so the combination of this dec-
rement with the little reduction of Information Loss has forced the Score value to be reduced. In this case, Score measure
started with a value of 47:11% and, after the evolutionary process, it ended with a value of 31:20%. This represents a dec-
rement of a 33:77%. Table 4 shows the initial and ﬁnal results of the three measures.
In the second experiment we used the German dataset considering 3 attributes to protect and their respective PRAM
matrices. This dataset has attributes with less categories than the dataset used in the ﬁrst experiment. So, with this second
experiment we are going to prove that our approach works well also with this kind of attributes. The ﬁrst attribute is namedFig. 5. Results for the protection of all three attributes EXISTACC, PRESEMPLOY, and SAVINGS at the same time in the German dataset.
Fig. 6. Evolution of the measures for the individual protection of the three attributes CLASS, LARGSPOT, and SPOTDIST in Solar Flare dataset.
J. Marés, V. Torra / Information Sciences 278 (2014) 344–356 353EXISTACC with 5 different ordinal categories, the second one is PRESEMPLOY with 6 different ordinal categories, and ﬁnally,
the third attribute is named SAVINGS with 6 different ordinal categories.
354 J. Marés, V. Torra / Information Sciences 278 (2014) 344–356The evolution of its Information Loss, Disclosure Risk and Score measures of all the individual protections for the attri-
butes are shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen that Disclosure Risk measures have been reduced so much (specially in the case
of PRESEMPLOY) with a big decrement in the ﬁrst generations. The decrement of the Information Loss measures is smaller
but it also exhibits the main decrement in the ﬁrst generations like in the case of Disclosure Risk. Moreover, the measures of
Information Loss and Disclosure Risk are being adjusted in an irregular way (there are some increments and decrements of
their values while Score is being reduced).
It has been proved that our approach is working well in protecting one ordinal attribute with only few categories. Now in
the last part of this second experiment all three attributes are going to be protected together in order to test our approach in
a multi-attribute protection for this kind of attributes.
Fig. 5 shows the evolution of the Information Loss, Disclosure Risk and Score for this multi-attribute protection. During
the evolutionary process it can be seen that there is a quite progressive decrement of the Score value during all the process.
Moreover the Disclosure Risk has increased instead of decreased, but its ﬁnal value is quite close to the initial one while the
Information Loss has suffered a big decrement, so the combination of the two measures forced to reduce the Score value. In
this case, the Score measure started with a value of 52:99% and after the evolutionary process it ended with a value of
32:84%. This represents a decrement of a 38:03%. Table 4 shows the initial and ﬁnal results of the three measures.
Finally in our third experiment we used the Solar Flare dataset considering 3 attributes to protect with their respective
PRAM matrices. The difference of this dataset is that we are going to protect nominal attributes instead of ordinal attributes
like in the previous experiments in order to prove that our approach works also well with this kind of attributes. The ﬁrst
attribute is named CLASS with 8 different nominal categories, the second one is LARGSPOT with 7 different nominal catego-
ries, and ﬁnally, the third attribute is named SPOTDIST with 5 different nominal categories.
First we protected each attribute independently obtaining the results shown in Fig. 6. In this case there is a slow decre-
ment for the Information Loss measures while Disclosure Risk is having a very big decrement in the ﬁrst generations. Looking
at the evolution of the Score measure, we see that it has a quite regular and important decrement during all the process.
Next step is to protect all three attributes together in order to test our approach in a multi-attribute protection for this
kind of attributes.
Fig. 7 shows the behavior of Information Loss, Disclosure Risk and Score for this multi-attribute protection in this Solar
Flare dataset. In this ﬁgure it can be seen that all three measures have a fast stabilization around generation 600. Disclosure
Risk has increased a little but Information Loss has been suffered a big decrement which causes an important reduction to
the values of the Score measure. In Table 5 we see that the Score measure has started the evolutionary process with a value of
53:83% and after the evolutionary process it ended with a value of 33:16%. This represents a decrement of a 38:40%.
There is also another interesting point to discuss. That is the changes that have been performed between the original
matrices and the ﬁnal ones. Table 6 shows the ﬁnal matrix of the DEGREE attribute (initial matrix is shown in Table 1). Note
that, as in the initial matrix, the maximum values in each row are highlighted.
It is easy to see that after the evolutionary process the new matrix has a lot of changes, but the most remarkable one is
that, in general, all the highest row values (which are the ones corresponding to the category with highest probability to
substitute the original one) are outside of the diagonal, whereas in the initial matrices, largest values were all in the diagonal.
Nevertheless, it is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd a model of matrix or a general pattern that is the best for all problems. That is so
because the best matrices obtained in the different evolutions have different structures and different probability distribu-
tions over the rows. To ﬁnd such a model without the effective model of our approach using genetic algorithms is an open
problem.Fig. 7. Results for the protection of all three attributes CLASS, LARGSPOT, and SPOTDIST at the same time in Solar Flare dataset.
Table 5
Initial and ﬁnal Scores for the protection of the three attributes CLASS, LARGSPOT, and SPOTDIST at the same time in the Solar
Flare dataset.
IL DR Score
Initial 81.18 26.49 53.83
Final 34.91 31.41 33.16
Table 6
Final PRAM matrix with p = 0.5 for DEGREE attribute corresponding to U.S. Housing Survey dataset. The bold values represent the most probable category
where each one will be changed to when using the PRAM matrix to protect the data.
0.011 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.926 0.009 0.011 0.014
0.000 0.004 0.971 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
0.027 0.625 0.009 0.027 0.205 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.049 0.037 0.432 0.074 0.062 0.259 0.049 0.037
0.032 0.005 0.006 0.928 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008
0.892 0.008 0.033 0.008 0.011 0.017 0.017 0.014
0.003 0.030 0.004 0.004 0.466 0.487 0.003 0.003
0.430 0.416 0.005 0.006 0.019 0.006 0.006 0.111
Table 7
Initial and ﬁnal categories frequencies in DEGREE attribute corresponding to U.S. Housing Survey dataset.
Categories ‘1’ ‘2’ ‘3’ ‘4’ ‘5’ ‘6’ ‘9’ ‘–’
Initial freq. 98 173 251 195 170 80 33 0
Final freq. 96 171 250 181 181 81 17 23
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than in the original dataset, and the matrix also introduces more uncertainty to the protected dataset (i.e. the ﬁnal distribu-
tion entropy is bigger than the one of the initial distribution). Table 7 shows the differences between initial and ﬁnal fre-
quencies inside the dataset after the protection.
5. Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have proposed an optimization method for PRAM using an evolutionary algorithm in order to seek new
enhanced PRAMmatrices to perform better protections for categorical attributes protecting either one or multiple attributes
at the same time. It has been tested with three dataset with different properties: the U.S. Housing dataset with ordinal attri-
butes and large number of categories per attribute, the German dataset with ordinal attributes and only few number of cat-
egories per attribute, and the Solar Flare dataset with nominal attributes. In all the cases we obtained very good results.
For the ﬁrst dataset we obtained an improvement for a multi-attribute protection of a 33:77%, for the second dataset the
improvement was of a 38:03%, and ﬁnally for the third dataset we obtained a 38:40% of improvement. This result represents
the effectiveness of our approach.
Evolutionary algorithms have the advantage that they can be adapted very easily to other ﬁtness functions. This is impor-
tant for our approach because, as it is based on an evolutionary algorithm, it can be adapted to other possible future new
measures of Information Loss and Disclosure Risk just by providing a different ﬁtness function. This decoupling of the algo-
rithm from protection measures is an interesting property that might deserve future research.
As a disadvantage there is the computational cost of the current Information Loss and Disclosure Risk measures that guide
the ﬁtness evaluation at each generation, but it can be compensated by the property of evolutionary algorithms where the
implementation may be parallelized in order to reduce performance costs. This can be taken into account for other future
optimizations exploration.
Another line for future work was outlined in Section 4. That is ﬁnd general models of matrices from the ones obtained by
our approach that lead to good scores. We have seen that the genetic algorithm is able to improve in a signiﬁcant way the
results of the usual Markov matrices used by PRAM. Nevertheless, ﬁnding an analytical deﬁnition of these effective matrices
would reduce the burden of using genetic algorithms.
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